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Abstract 
The effective number of political parties (ENP) in a first-past-the-post single member (SMP) electoral system is analyzed as a 
dynamic process whereby the tournament nature of the election contest induces excessive entry and sunk entry costs 
promote persistence even as Duverger-Demsetz type political competition works to winnow unsuccessful minor candidates 
and parties. The result is a fringe of ever changing marginal parties circulating in long run equilibrium. The factors 
hypothesized to affect the entry and exit of candidates and parties are analyzed first using an auto-regressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model whose advantage is that it allows the separation of an evolving long run equilibrium from short run variations 
in response to transitory changes in conditioning variables and the process of converging back to the long run equilibrium. 
The possibility that the short run adjustment process is asymmetric either for parties or candidates is tested using panel 
estimation techniques. The results are consistent with an observed time path that incorporates slower adjustment to positive 
as opposed to negative shocks. Variations in the size and trend of both the long and short run are then examined for ENP’s 
ability to predict changes in the competitiveness of the Canadian federal electoral system.  
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1. Introduction
Any analysis of the structure of political parties and their competitiveness in the electoral 
process must confront the fact that political parties differ widely in their ability to win electoral 
support and compete effectively.  In Canada, for example, the majority of federally registered 
political parties receive relatively few votes and exit the electoral process quite quickly.  A 
smaller number of parties have achieved intermediate success, with some lasting as long as 
twenty elections, while only two have succeeded in surviving for the full forty-two elections 
that comprise Canada’s entire post-Confederation electoral history.  Constituencies also differ 
in their ability to attract good candidates and so generate the level of competition that best 
promotes local interests and the constituency‘s perspective on policies of national interest.  
Considerations of size, location and longevity then force recognition that some parties and 
constituencies are more influential than others.  How the support for different candidates and 
parties is distributed across the electorate will weigh heavily in the structure of political 
equilibrium and the nature of political competition.  
In part for these reasons, political scientists tend to discuss the structure of political equilibrium 
in terms of the effective rather than actual number of political parties or candidates (hereafter 
ENP).2 Because an increase in ENP typically means more alternatives, an increase is often taken 
to signal an increase in the intensity of political competition (see Lijphart, 1984; Andrews and 
Money, 2009; Hinchliffe and Lee, 2016).  In the particular case of Canada, political competition 
within a Westminster plurality electoral system has resulted in two distinct party types that 
have alternated times in power (see Ferris and Voia, 2016).  Despite the persistence of this 
duality through time, however, ENP has not remained constant.  This implies that any 
2 ENP weighs each party (candidate) by its vote share squared and is formally defined as one over a Herfindahl 
Index of vote shares.  In what follows we use two ENP measures: the first, ENP_Candidate, uses the vote share 
received by each candidate at the constituency level (averaged across all constituencies); the second, ENP_Party, 
uses the vote shares of the 105 named parties in the election rolls plus one (for all other non-party participants, 
called ‘other’ (with three aberrant)).  Canada presents a number of challenges in calculating this number, with the 
early elections featuring a number of acclamations (candidates elected but receiving no cast votes). In our analysis 
each candidate elected by acclamation was treated as having received a vote share of 1. For the national party 
measure, the party vote share received in each acclamation was weighted by the average number of non-
acclaimed constituency votes. The correlation between the number of registered political parties and ENP_Party 
across 1870-2011 is small (-.094).  Both ENP measures were interpolated between election years. 
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explanation for the variation in ENP must account for the variations in the number of and 
support for the evolving pattern of mid to marginally sized parties/candidates that re-appear in 
each election (Travits, 2007).  To explain the variation in this fringe of smaller parties, we follow 
Forand and Maheshri (2015) who, agreeing with Chhibber and Kollman (1998), note that “[a]s 
important features of political environments evolve over time, changes in the number of parties 
over time should be expected; an issue that existing parties have difficulty capturing can 
become salient, giving a new party an opportunity for entry, or an existing party can be 
discredited by scandal, which can lead to the disbanding of this party or its replacement by a 
new alternative” (p.286).  In this way the continual entry of new parties and candidates serves 
to promote new ideas and organizational change within the political process (Aldrich, 1995; 
Bruns, 2011).  Whether the concomitant increase in ENP is a signal of greater electoral 
competition remains to be seen.  
In what follows we argue that because the observed levels of ENP include in their measure the 
dynamic process of entry and exit, the actual level of ENP may be a biased measure of the long 
run structure of the political equilibrium. This is because the conditions governing the processes 
of entry and exit may vary across time and the factors that determine the rate of convergence 
back to equilibrium from random shocks may not be symmetric.  To separate the adjustment 
process from the longer run evolution of our measures of ENP across time, we use auto-
regressive distributed lag (ARDL) modelling.  This allows estimation of separate long and short 
run effects arising from the benefits and costs of entering the political process (Cox, 1997; 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000) and the separation of both from the movements in the data 
that describe convergence back to the long run equilibrium.  ARDL modelling is then applied to 
Canada over the long 1870 - 2011 time period.   
Implicit in the use of ARDL modeling is the presumption that the short run changes in ENP in 
response to transitory and permanent variations in their conditioning variables and shocks are 
symmetric on either side of the long run equilibrium time path.  However, the all-or-nothing 
nature of the political contest in a single member district, plurality rule political system (SMP) in 
the presence of sunk entry costs suggests that short run movements may respond differently to 
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positive versus negative shocks.  To examine this possibility, we treat positive and negative 
changes as generating different states and use asymmetric ARDL panel data techniques 
(NARDL) to assess whether candidate and/or political party measures respond differently to 
positive versus negative changes and shocks, and if so, what effect that asymmetry has on the 
measure of the long run.  To anticipate our later findings, short run adjustment appears to be 
symmetric about the measure of long run ENP_Candidate but asymmetric about the long run 
equilibrium of ENP_Party.  Positive shocks generate more persistence and less rapid 
convergence back to the long run than do negative shocks.  
Once the appropriate long run and short run fringes have been calculated, we are in position to 
ask whether it is the variation or trend in the long run that better signals a change in the 
competitiveness of the political system than does the variation in the short run fringe.        
2. Duverger’s Law and the Fringe of Marginal Political Parties
It is impossible to discuss ENP seriously without encountering Duverger's Law (1959)--the 
hypothesis that the expected number of parties in a SMP political system will tend towards 2.3  
As Grofman, Bowler and Blais (2009, p. 1) write, “this seemingly straightforward statement, 
made over 50 years ago, has become perhaps the most famous theoretical generalization in 
political science.”  As a positive statement about the equilibrium structure produced by 
competition among political parties, Duverger’s Law is much more precise than anything 
offered in economics, where the number of firms producing private goods under competition is 
generally indeterminate.4 This degree of precision makes for a seemingly straightforward test 
of the predicted structure of competitive equilibrium in a political party system and the long 
term stability of Canada’s Westminster parliamentary system provides an excellent setting for 
its test against the data.  When this has been done, however, the typical finding has been that 
Canada’s two ENP measures are both greater than 2 and rising (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; 
3 Two parties each receiving half of the vote would result in an ENP = 2.  References that expand upon Duverger’s 
classic work include: Riker (1976), Cox (1997), Taagepera (1999), Chhibber and Kollman (2004). 
4 In a perfectly competitive atomistic industry producing private goods under constant cost, the expected number 
of firms is indeterminate. The more general definition perfect competition--that under perfect competition price 
equals marginal cost—is equally precise but untestable since marginal cost is typically unobservable to the 
outsider. 
4 
Johnston and Cutler, 2009). This is illustrated in Figure 1 below, where our two ENP measures--
a party-based measure of ENP (ENP_Party) and a candidate based measure (ENP_Candidate), 
both built up from the constituency level--are presented from 1867 onwards.  As Duverger also 
predicted, and as is seen to be the case here, the candidate-based ENP measure is smaller than 
the party-based ENP measure.  In both cases, however, ENP had risen above 2 by the 14th 
election (in 1921) and both have continued to rise until most recently. This apparent 
contradiction of Duverger's convergence prediction is often referred to as Canadian 
exceptionalism (Rae, 1971; Riker, 1976, p. 760; Gaines, 1999).   
-- insert Figure 1 about here – 
While the growing departure of ENP from 2 is often taken to be the most striking feature of 
Figure 1, what is also interesting is the pattern of similarity and difference in the two ENP time 
paths.  In the first thirty years following Confederation in 1867, for example, ENP_Party fell 
rapidly towards 2 while the ENP_Candidate began below 2 in 1867 and rose rapidly to meet it. 
This early pattern of convergence on 2 has, of course, been noticed by political scientists and 
while the specific reasons given for consolidation within and between the two major political 
parties may differ (see, for example, Cox (1987) and Godbout and Hoyland (2013)), all concur 
that the early post-Confederation period for ENP_Party represented one of national party 
consolidation.  The rise in ENP_Candidate, on the other hand, reflects the spread of electoral 
competition within constituencies as the large number acclamations arising in the early federal 
elections slowly fell with rising numbers of candidate rivals.5 In the empirical work below, the 
trend in ENP_Party through 1897 (CONVERGENCE_TREND) is used to reflect this period of 
‘learning-by-doing’ as Canada strove to convert older colonial governing structures into the 
nation-wide party structure needed for competition at the national level. 
While the early period may be somewhat anomalous in reflecting the different formative stages 
of national party and constituency growth, the long period that follows 1900 is characterized 
5 Roughly 25 percent of the members of the first parliament were acclaimed (46 of 180 in 1867) and this had fallen 
to roughly 2 percent by 1896 (4 of 206).  There was one anomalous election in 1917 (WW1) election when 
acclamations rose to 31 of 230 members.  However there have been virtually no acclamations since, with the last 
acclamation arising in 1957.   
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more by the co-movement of the two ENP measures (their correlation equals .86).  In large part 
this reflects the characteristic that party politics in Canada has been dominated by the 
interchange of governance between two evolving major political parties (called, for 
convenience, the Liberal and Conservative Parties).6  An implication of the virtual monopoly on 
governance by these two parties is that the observed changes in ENP will then reflect to a large 
extent changes in the size or voting strength of the fringe parties and candidates that enter and 
exit the political area.  One measure of the size of the fringe of minor parties can be seen from 
Figure 1 as the deviation between the two ENP measures. That is, while the two ENP measures 
have typically varied together in the time period following convergence, they have also moved 
ever further apart, a process that represents a growth in the effective number of parties 
relative to the effective number of candidates.  In Canada, the departure in the two ENP 
measures has been called multipartism (Johnston and Cutler, 2009) and its growth is often 
attributed to the emergence and success of regional specific federal parties. Our interest in 
what follows is on variations in the size of this fringe of lesser major political parties/candidates 
and its meaning for the competitiveness of elections within SMP political systems.  For us the 
important empirical feature of ENP that needs explanation is the presence of a time varying 
fringe of mid-to-minor political parties and its implications for the competitiveness of Canada’s 
political system.   
3. Political Competition, Tournaments and Political Party Equilibrium in SMP systems
While initially developed by Laakso and Taagerapera (1979) as a measure of political instability, 
ENP is often used in the political and economic literatures as a measure of the competitiveness 
of the political system (see Aidt and Eterovic, 2011; Drazen and Eslava, 2010; and Boulding and 
Brown, 2014 for recent examples).  Analogous to the use of a Herfindahl index of output shares 
among firms in an industry to measure economic market power, a less concentrated political 
area of political parties (a larger ENP) is viewed as an indicator of greater party choice, greater 
electoral outcome uncertainty and hence evidence of greater competition in the political 
6 Third parties, such as the Bloc Québécois, the Reform and the New Democratic parties, have occasionally served 
as the official opposition but have never formed a government. 
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environment.  But an electoral system is not a private goods market where multiple firms sell a 
single output to consumers at a constant price.  Rather the right to govern an electorate is 
more analogous to a public good, where a single governing authority sets the policies and 
programs that are consumed concurrently by all voters.  Given the efficiency of one governing 
coalition and voters’ ability to replace incumbent governments in regularly recurring elections, 
then, as Demsetz (1968) has argued in another context, parties will compete for the right to 
govern by offering to provide alternative sets of policies and programs.  Competition among 
political parties for the right to govern when combined with voters’ ability to choose program 
offerings for the one that most closely approximates their preferred set of outcomes can then 
lead to a Lindahl efficient equilibrium solution.7  
For party competition to enhance welfare, however, alternative parties must not only promise 
superior program alternatives, they must also be a credible alternative to the incumbent.  The 
contending party must be seen as able to step in and perform should the level of performance 
promised by the incumbent not be forthcoming or the programs promised be reneged upon.  
Hence contestability in the sense developed by Baumol et. al. (1982) -- the ability to credibly 
replace the incumbent producer -- is necessary for the benefits of competition to be realized 
effectively by the community.  Because the greater fragmentation signalled by a higher ENP 
means that each of the smaller contending parties is less likely to win a majority of seats, and 
because party coalitions are both difficult to arrange and maintain over time in SMP systems, 
the promises of these parties become less credible to voters and hence form less of a credible 
threat to the incumbent government.  In the SMP system, then, the incentive not to waste 
one’s vote by supporting a nonviable alternative implies that the greater is party fragmentation, 
the less effective will second or third placed parties be as meaningful constraints on the 
performance of the governing party.  It is the inability to provide meaningful contestability in a 
SMP political system then that underlies the winnowing process highlighted by Duverger 
                                                          
7 For a more extended development of this argument, called the Duverger-Demsetz hypothesis, see Ferris, Winer 
and Grofman (2016). 
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leading to convergence upon 2 as the number of effective political parties that will arise in a 
competitive equilibrium. 
At the same time that the Duverger-Demsetz competitive process works to winnow the number 
of existing political parties, the tournament nature of a SMP election will itself work to generate 
a larger number of competitors. This is because the first-past-the-post voting system has all the 
characteristics of a winner-take-all tournament whose distinguishing feature, in the presence of 
open entry, is overcrowding.8 That is, in contests where there is the possibility of winning a 
large prize, but only if the contest is won, the number of contestants typically attracted into the 
contest will be larger than the number (one) that can ultimately be successful.9  In choosing to 
enter, each entrant weighs the expected benefit from winning relative to the cost of entry and 
depending upon the size of the perceived benefit, entry can continue to arise even if the 
probability of winning is very low.  In the absence of significant political barriers to entry, new 
parties will continue to enter until the expected benefit of winning falls into line with the cost 
of entry.  The result is a larger number of political parties participating in each election than can 
succeed in the longer run.  They form a fringe of political parties that may ultimately find 
success in having their organization, advocacy of innovative policies or programs absorbed by 
the major parties before Duverger type competitive pressures lead to their disappearance over 
the longer run (Bruns, 2011).  
For political parties the cost of entry consists relate primarily to party formation and gaining 
electoral status.  They are often fixed in size and must be incurred prior to entry.  Once a party 
has been formed and its electoral status won, these entry costs become sunk and hence are 
irrelevant when considering whether to continue or not. The situation is somewhat different for 
individual candidates because nomination filing deposits are often returned and campaign 
                                                          
8 See, for example, Lizzeri and Persico (2005) and Fischbacher and Thoni (2008).  Vandegrift, Yavas and Brown 
(2007) provide experimental evidence on how the degree of participant overcrowding is a function the way that 
the tournament prizes are proportioned (with winner-take-all tournaments generating the most overcrowding). 
9 A classic early application is by Harris and Todaro (1970) who used this equilibrium concept to explain why in 
many lesser developed countries employed farm workers voluntarily leave the farm to become part of a large pool 
of unemployed urban workers in the competition for the scarce but high paying jobs in the city.  Other examples 
include the large number of unsuccessful artists and actors working as waiters in New York and Los Angeles. 
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expenses are largely publicly funded.10 It follows that sunk entry costs create an asymmetry for 
the party’s in its decision whether to stay relative to enter.  This asymmetry implies that even as 
the Duverger-Demsetz process introduces greater realism into the perceived benefit of 
electoral participation, the lower cost of continuing as opposed to initial entry may allow even 
minimally successful parties the ability to stay in the electoral process longer than would 
otherwise be the case.  Tenure in the party fringe persists somewhat longer than the observed 
lack of electoral success might indicate.11   
In the absence of restrictions on entry, continuous change in the composition of the electorate 
and their ideological and policy preferences create ongoing opportunities for new parties and 
candidates that will perturb any long run equilibrium.  In addition, negative shocks to the party 
equilibrium, such as those that induce party exit from political scandal, will be quickly offset by 
standby participants.  This implies that with the continual arrival of new party hopefuls and the 
grudging exit of previous entrants, the Duverger-Demsetz tendency for party numbers to 
converge back towards 2 following a shock will be postponed.  For ENP_Party in particular, the 
short run transition process can result in an observed outcome in which the mean number of 
political parties will be larger than the number indicative of long run equilibrium.  Sunk entry 
costs in combination with the tournament nature of the SMP political contest can then produce 
an asymmetry in which unsuccessful entrants typically outstay their welcome and the observed 
effective number of parties exceeds the effective number that can survive in a longer run 
equilibrium.  We turn next to model the long run before seeing whether there is evidence of 
such an asymmetry in either ENP measure. 
4. Modeling strategy and the factors affecting the ENP_Candidate and ENP_Party 
                                                          
10 In Canada a candidate’s $1000 nomination deposit is returned once the candidate complies with election return 
filings. Moreover all election and personal campaign expenses are paid up to a maximum of 60 percent of the 
ridings established expense limit provided the candidate receives at least 10 percent of the valid votes cast.    
11 The dynamic implication of this aspect of the entry/exit decision faced by political parties in plurality electoral 
systems has been modelled more formally by Forand and Maheshri (2015).  Their focus is on how the fixed entry 
cost creates a ‘barrier to exit’ if there remains an expectation of electoral success in the future.  
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Cox (1997) provides the methodology most often used to explain the entry/exit decision of 
political parties and their candidates.  Under this approach a potential candidate or party is 
viewed as weighing the expected benefits and cost of entry and choosing to enter the electoral 
arena as long as the benefits they expect to receive by winning sufficient electoral support for 
their proposed programs and policies exceeds the expected cost of entry.  With multiple 
potential parties and candidates, entry will continue until for the marginal party entrant the net 
benefit falls to zero.  Having achieved initial success, political parties and candidates will 
continue to participate only if their revised expectation of the benefit of continuing exceeds the 
ongoing cost of maintaining support in upcoming elections.   
While the two decision rules seem intuitively plausible, the hypotheses become testable only if 
we can identify a set of factors that represent changes in the probability of initial and 
continuing electoral success, the expected benefit of continued participation, setup and 
continuation costs.  What makes this more difficult is that the benefits of electoral participation 
as perceived by candidates and parties are typically unobservable.  This implies that 
operationalizing the theory for Canada requires the finding of a set of variables that both span 
our entire time period and can capture changes in the other three components (ideally, with 
unchanged perceptions of the benefit of participating).      
To implement a test of this hypothesis we follow the established literature in assuming that the 
expected number of political parties competing in an election, ENP_Party, and the expected 
number of candidates, ENP_Candidate, are a function of the different demographic, 
institutional and organizational features of the Canadian political environment.  In particular, 
EXP_X = f(Electoral space, voter heterogeneity, incumbency success, pecuniary rewards and 
costs of participation, institutional characteristics of the electoral voting system),    (1) 
where X = Candidate, Party. 
We begin to operationalize this hypothesis by choosing first three variables often used to 
describe the electoral space available to parties wishing to participate in the political arena:  the 
relative size of the voting franchise (REGISTERED), the voter turnout rate (TURNOUT); and the 
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relative voting size of the average constituency (CONSTITUENCY SIZE).12  An increase in the 
proportion of the population eligible to vote and the proportion of those eligible who chose to 
vote will both increase electoral participation which in turn increases the range of programs 
and policies that a more diversified electorate will consider of value.  Greater participation is 
then expected to increase the likelihood of new party/candidate success and provide increased 
potential support to existing fringe parties.  Both work to increase ENP (Berrington, 1985).  In a 
similar way the larger the number of proportion voters in each constituency, the larger will be 
the expected number of parties/candidates that can be supported (Clark and Golder, 2006).  
Larger constituency sizes allow heterogeneity to achieve a scale sufficient to support more 
candidates and parties, “to allow social divisions to be mobilized and expressed electorally” 
(Singer and Stephenson, 2009, p. 480).  Note that in relative terms, the greater heterogeneity 
likely in a larger sized constituency increases the value of candidate characteristics relative to 
the party.  With party participation needing to establish policy on a national basis, a candidate 
that can appeal to distinct local or regional as opposed to national concerns may find success. 
This implies that independent or minor party candidates may be more successful in larger the 
sized constituencies. 
For any given level of electoral participation and district size, greater voter heterogeneity would 
also be expected to support a larger number of candidates and/or political parties (Singer and 
Stephenson, 2009).  Here we use the degree of religious diversity in the country (RELIGION) as 
one distinct dimension of heterogeneity.13 To the extent that a broader range of religious 
groupings reflects a broader range of political ideologies and policy aspirations, increases in this 
expected number would be expected to create greater space for participation and hence 
increase ENP.  A second metric that has sometimes been used as an index of heterogeneity is 
the proportion of the population that are recent immigrants (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 
                                                          
12 In Canada the voting franchise grew from 8.3% of the population in 1867 to 76.7% by 2011, with the biggest 
jump coming in the extension of the franchise to women (beginning in 1917).  Greater detail on the specific 
definition and data source of each variable is given in the Data Appendix at the end of the paper. 
13 Religious diversity is measured as one over a Herfindahl index of population shares within six religious 
denominational categories (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, other religions, and unknown), interpolated 
between censuses. 
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1994).14 Under their hypothesis a larger inflow of immigration in the period leading into an 
election (IMRATIO) diversifies the interests of the electorate, opening more policy space for the 
participation of additional parties or the expansion of previously marginal political parties 
(Carty, 2002).  A counter hypothesis, suggested by Ferris and Voia (2016) argues that recent 
immigrants are more conservative in their political choices than the general population and can 
often be targeted more easily by the major contending parties.  In such a case ENP will fall with 
IMRATIO rather than rise.  A third demographic feature that may reflect heterogeneity and 
hence influence the expected number of candidates or parties is the proportion of the 
population in urban as opposed to rural areas (URBANIZATION).  While there is a long literature 
linking urbanization and political democratization (Anthony, 2014), we have no prior on 
whether Canada’s growing urbanization has resulted in more or less voter homogeneity and 
hence on whether relationship between urbanization and the expected number of candidates 
or parties is positive or negative.  
One organizational or institutional feature of the electoral system that makes the entry of new 
candidates and parties and their continued participation more difficult is the competition of 
candidates who have already been elected as members of parliament.  As is well known (for 
Canada, see Kendall and Rekkas, 2012), an incumbency advantage exists which decreases the 
likelihood that non-incumbents can achieve electoral success if they run against an incumbent 
member of the House.  It follows that the larger is the proportion of incumbent members 
running again for office, AVG_INCUMBENTS, the lower will be the entry of new members and 
larger exit rate of existing candidates.  Both work to make ENP smaller than would otherwise be 
expected.15  A organizational convention of Canadian election practice has been the suspension 
or relaxation of electoral competition between the two main political parties during the two 
world wars (Berrington, 1985, p.447).  In general, the relaxation of regular party completion 
during a war and the introduction of new issues and concerns arising during the world wars 
                                                          
14 The acquisition of Canadian citizenship takes three consecutive years of residence and confers voting rights at 
the municipal, provincial and federal level. 
15 We recognize that incumbency will be codetermined with ENP in the general political equilibrium.  This 
underscores the point that the empirical relationship found in this paper should not be interpreted as causal in the 
direction implied by their order in the test but rather as part of the cointegrating relationship among the variables 
to form a long run equilibrium time path.  
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would be expected to give more opportunities for new party entry.  However, Canada’s WW1 
experience was somewhat different, characterized by its extended period of coalition 
government and the legislative passage of the Wartimes Election and Military Voters Acts that 
successfully skewed the 1917 vote towards the ‘Government’ and away from its ‘Opposition’ 
and potential new parties.  We test for the presence of these different wartime period effects 
by including separate dummy variables (1 versus 0) for time periods involving WW1 and WW2.   
The benefits received by candidates, political parties and their supporters for participating in 
the political process and achieving electoral success are primarily nonpecuniary and typically 
unobservable.   This inability to quantify means that changes in their value will appear in the 
empirical work below as shocks impacting our system of equations.  On the other hand, 
successful candidates and their parties benefit directly in pecuniary ways and the expectation 
of winning these benefits can influence the decision to participation.  We use two measures of 
the pecuniary benefits received by candidates who win their election in Canada: the wage 
received by members of parliament relative to outside alternatives, RELATIVE_MP_WAGE, and 
the pension that can be received upon retirement or electoral loss.  For the latter we use an 
index of financial accruals relative to contribution rates, PENSION_ PARAMETERS, to measure 
the generosity of parliamentary pensions.  Ceteris paribus, the greater is the financial reward 
from (lower the cost of) participating in the political process, the greater is the likelihood that a 
marginal candidate will participate and the lower is the cost to the political party of recruiting a 
set of competent representatives.  Both measures are expected to increase ENP.  
Finally, in 1974 the public funding of political parties (FUNDING1974) was introduced in Canada 
(eliminating corporate and union contributions and substituting a per-vote subsidy to parties, 
subsidization electoral expenses and allowing tax credits to individual contributors).16 Providing 
candidates and parties funds for election activities would be expected to encourage electoral 
participation, expand the number of political parties and candidates and thus increase both ENP 
                                                          
16 Public funding in 1974 introduced two key types of electoral support: for individuals, a political contribution tax 
credit for up to 75% for small contributions then falling; and for parties and their candidates, parties that spent at 
least 10% of their spending limit could get 22% refunded and candidates who got at least 15% of the vote could get 
50% back.  The percentages and forms of support have varied through time.  See Jensen and Young, 2011. 
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measures.  However, to qualify for public support a political party must be registered and must 
have received at least 2% of the valid votes in the preceding general election or 5% of the valid 
votes in the electoral districts in which it had a candidate.  In addition, only political parties 
(rather than independent candidates) receive research and staffing support in parliament and 
only if they maintain party status, i.e., hold a minimum of 12 seats in the House of Commons.  It 
follows that while all parties tend to receive benefits, major parties will benefit more than both 
parties that are small and receive relatively few votes and potential entrants that receive no 
support at all.  By supporting established parties and their candidates, public funding also 
disadvantages the candidates of small parties and particularly independent candidates.17  
The long run equilibrium relationship expected from this analysis, written in linear form, is: 
ENP_X = c0 + c1 RELATIVE_MP_WAGE + c2 PENSION_PARAMETERS + c3 REGISTERED + c4 TURNOUT  
+ c5 CONSTITUENCY SIZE + c6 AVG_INCUMBENT + c7 RELIGION + c8 IMRATIO + c9 URBAN_PROPORTION  
+ c10 WW1 + c11 WW2 + c12 CONVERGENCE_TREND + c13 FUNDING1974,          (2) 
where the expected coefficient signs are c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c7, c11, and both c12 and c13 (for 
parties) > 0;  c6, c10 and c13 (for candidates) < 0; and c8 and c9 are ambiguous in sign ex ante. 
   
5.  ARDL tests and Symmetric results 
The time series processes that describe ENP_Candidate and ENP_Party and the political and 
election variables considered as their determinants are both stationary, I(0), and nonstationary, 
I(1), in nature.18 To handle the time series issues raised by such a combination of variables, the 
autoregressive distributed lag approach (hereafter ARDL) of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) has 
                                                          
17 FUNDING1974 = 1 for the years 1974 – 2011, 0 otherwise. 
18 Much of the empirical work on new party entry and party longevity has been cross country (Hamel and 
Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2001; Travits, 2007; Nishikawa; 2010) where varying institutional detail—differences in 
electoral rules, threshold petition requirements, other entry conditions and registration costs/subsidies—provide 
the observables to explain why entry occurs more often in one country than others. Here we follow authors like 
Happy (1989) and Lucardie (2007) and apply the analysis to a single country where the institutional framework for 
elections and governance has been largely unchanged. In such cases the econometric issues become ones of 
cointegration and convergence among time series. 
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proven to be particularly useful.19 The advantage of the ARDL method is that it is designed to 
assess whether or not a cointegration (long run equilibrium) relationship exists among a group 
of variables when the orders of integration are ambiguous and when the sample size is small.  If 
cointegration is found (as indicated by the bounds test), the ARDL method generates not only 
the long run equilibrium path but also the short run convergent process that surrounds the long 
run equilibrium. In describing the dynamic processes that generate this outcome, the method 
also allows for lags of differing length to capture the varying degrees of persistence exercised 
by each of the interrelated variables.  For our purposes the ARDL approach and its nonlinear 
NARDL extension by Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) are particularly relevant, the latter 
because we suspect that the observed evolution of ENP may reflect the confluence of a long 
run equilibrium process and a short run convergence process is asymmetric in responding to 
the disturbances that shock the political system and induce entry and exit.  The conceptual 
ability to separate these influences is critical for assessing whether or not a long run equilibrium 
relationship exists and, if so, how its time path differs from what is actually observed.  As part 
of this process, the analysis also allows us to determine which variables are associated with 
long run size and whether or not these variables are significant only in the short run. 
A dynamic ARDL model of symmetric ENP adjustment can then be written as: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 +𝑖𝑖=4𝑖𝑖=1  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 4𝑖𝑖=0𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 +  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡,    (3)  
where the Zj are the k explanatory variables shown in equation (2) and where each variable can 
have up to four lagged terms.  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 is a white noise random variable. Before estimation was 
initiated, the Adjusted Dickey Fuller test statistics of each variable were first calculated to 
ensure that no variable was I(2).  After finding that all variables were either I(0) or I(1), the set 
of autoregressive distributed lagged equations were re-estimated allowing for a maximum of 4 
lags for each variable.  The Akaike criterion was then used to select the optimal combination of 
                                                          
19 In the political science literature, de Boeuf and Keele (2008) propose a similar method for modelling dynamic 
political (stationary) processes.  The advantage of the ARDL/NARDL framework is that there exists a set of formal 
tests to establish the presence and stability of the long run and dynamic processes, often packaged as part of a 
statistical time series program. The time series packages used here are Eviews 10 for ARDL and Stata 15 for panel 
ARDL.  
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lags for the test.  The final ARDL equations estimated for ENP_Candidate and ENP_Party are 
presented as Tables 1 and 2 along with the implied long run cointegrating equation and short 
run transition effects. The equations were subjected to two stability tests: the cumulative sum 
of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUM of Squares).  In 
each case the recursive sums remain within the 5 percent bounds.20 The values found in the 
associated Bounds test, presented as the bottom line in each table, are consistent with the 
existence of a long run cointegrating relationship among the I(1) variables and thus provide 
evidence of the existence of an equilibrium time path on which departures from equilibrium 
will converge.21 In forming this separation of the long run from the short run adjustment 
process the ARDL model assumes that convergence will be symmetric on either side of the long 
run equilibrium. 
-- Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here – 
The two sets of individual long run results presented in Tables 1 and 2 are interesting for both 
their similarities and differences.  In both ENP cases the set of variables perform well as a test 
of the explanatory power of our representation of the general Cox hypothesis.  The adjusted 
R2s tell us that the ARDL equations can explain virtually all of the observed variation in the 
candidate and party-based measures over our time period.  Similarly, the bounds test indicates 
that both ARDL models incorporate a longer run cointegrating relationship among the I(1) 
variables. The data is then consistent with the existence of an equilibrium time path that is 
surrounded by a short run process that incorporates convergence back to the equilibrium path.  
The long run coefficient estimates of ENP_Candidate conform in sign to the predictions of the 
earlier analysis and most are significantly different from zero at 10 percent or less.  Hence 
larger values of ENP_Candidate are associated with larger proportions of the population 
registered to vote, higher voter turnout, larger constituency sizes, fewer incumbents, and 
                                                          
20 To economize on space the ADF statistics and recursive residual diagrams are not included but are available 
upon request.  
21 Note also that the error correction terms, in the bottom of right hand corner of both tables, are both negative 
and significantly different from zero.  This signifies the stability of the longer run cointegrating relationship as 
shocks producing departures converge back to long run equilibrium. The small size of the error correction term in 
the party-measure indicates the persistence of any shock through a long period of readjustment.  
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WW2.  The special circumstances associated with WW1 and the introduction of public funding 
are associated with significant decreases in ENP_Candidate as expected. It is only with respect 
to the pecuniary returns to candidates--through salaries and/or pensions—that we find no 
significant effect on ENP_Candidate (using conventional standards of significance).22  The two 
hypotheses on which we have no strong priors—the effects of higher immigration rates and the 
proportion of the population in urban as opposed to rural areas— are both found to be 
inversely related to ENP_Candidate. 
In relative terms, the ENP_Party convergence process is indicated as being more protracted, 
that is the error correction term is somewhat smaller that of ENP_Candidate and the size of the 
lagged ENP values and their first differences are both larger, telling us that there will be more 
persistence in the response to the shocks that hit the ENP_Party equilibrium.  Many of the long 
run coefficient estimates are of similar sign to those found for ENP_Candidate but differ in their 
significance.  For example, religious diversity is much more significantly related to ENP_Party 
than ENP_Candidate while IMRATIO has had a more significant effect on ENP_Candidate than 
ENP_Party.  Moreover, while the general pattern of coefficient findings follows that set out in 
the candidate case, there is much less agreement between the estimated and predicted sign 
(and significance) of the long run coefficient estimates in the ENP_Party case.  For example, 
while it is not surprising that the introduction of public funding of established political parties 
will have increased ENP_Party and lowered ENP_Candidate, it is more surprising that increases 
in constituency size are found to be associated with decreases in ENP_Party and increases in 
the average number of incumbents in an election is associated with increases rather than 
decreases in ENP_Party.23   
-- Figures 2 and 3 about here -- 
The time paths associated with the ARDL model estimates and their equilibrium time paths are 
shown in Figures 2 and 3.  The tight convergence of the actual ENP values and their ARDL model 
                                                          
22 This may imply that formal pecuniary considerations are not high on the priority list of candidates running for 
office.   
23 Neither of these effects is significant, however.  See also how the results change when asymmetric short run 
adjustment is considered. 
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forecasts reflects the strong explanatory power of these models in being able to explain 
virtually all of the variation in ENP over our time period.  The long run ‘equilibrium’ time paths 
implied by the models’ cointegrating equations appear as the dashed line with circles on the 
two diagrams and seem to show a somewhat different pattern of covariation.  In Figure 2, for 
example, the long run variation in ENP_Candidate appears to be fairly smooth with changes 
that typically moderate the larger variations in the actual and forecasted values.  On the other 
hand, following the convergence period running through the turn of the century in Figure 3, the 
variations in long run ENP_Party appear to be both sharper and less synchronized with both 
ENP_Party and ENP_Party Forecast than is ENP_Candidate_Long Run with its forecasted and 
actual values.  The difference in the two short runs, defined as the difference between the 
forecasted and long run values, is shown in Figure 4 and illustrates the point quite dramatically. 
While not dissimilar in the timing of their variation, the short run variations in ENP_Party are 
considerably larger than their ENP_Candidate counterpart.24      
-- Insert Figure 4 about here -- 
An important cautioning note with respect to these findings is suggested by our earlier 
discussion of the all-or-nothing nature of the election contest in combination with sunk entry 
costs.  Together they suggest that the short run adjustment process may be asymmetric.  
Particularly for political parties, positive shocks or transitory changes that encourage party 
entry may have larger and more persistent effects on ENP_Party than similar sized negative 
shocks.  This in turn implies that if an asymmetry is present, not only will the ARDL’s short run 
symmetric coefficient estimates and their standard errors be biased, but because the long and 
short runs are estimated simultaneously, bias may also appear in the long run coefficients and 
their standard errors.  In the following Section we explore this possibility. 
6. Nonlinear ARDL (NARDL) Estimation and Results 
                                                          
24  The coefficient of variation in short run movements in ENP_Party is over 100 times larger than the coefficient of 
variation in short run ENP_Candidate (969.8 to 5.28). 
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Although the previous results already imply the existence of a cointegrating relationship for 
both ENP measures, our estimates of the long run equilibrium time path and corresponding 
short run can be improved upon if an asymmetry in the adjustment process is present and 
incorporated into our analysis. A test for asymmetry in the adjustment/convergence process 
can be undertaken by using an asymmetric variant of the ARDL model (NARDL).  Here we follow 
the methodology of Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) by first breaking all the covariates 
into positive and negative partial sums to allow for possibly different adjustment to positive 
and negative changes.  We then apply their nonlinear panel estimating method by treating the 
positive and negative partial sums as two separate states and using the pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimator.  This estimator generates separate short run coefficients and error variances 
for positive and negative changes while constraining the long run coefficients to be equal across 
states.  The PMG estimator also generates separate error correction terms for the positive and 
negative change states.  Should a Hausman test not reject the hypothesis that the short run 
coefficients generated by the PMG estimator are systematically different from the short 
average generated by the mean group (MG) estimating procedure, we can use the PMG 
estimates of the error correction and short run coefficients as the more efficient representation 
of the two states.  In this case, we reject the common ARDL estimates relative to the set of two 
separate short run estimates generated by the PMG procedure.  On the other hand, if the 
Hausman test does allow rejection of the hypothesis that the short run coefficient estimates 
are systematically different, then the separate short run coefficients and error correction terms 
generated by the PMG approach are inconsistent and can easily be biased.  In this case, we 
reject the hypothesis of short run asymmetry and fall back on the symmetric results presented 
in the previous section. 
The NARDL model used in the estimations below can be written as 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖+ +𝑖𝑖=4𝑖𝑖=1 ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖− +𝑖𝑖=4𝑖𝑖=1  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖+ 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖+4𝑖𝑖=0𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 +  ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖− 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖−  4𝑖𝑖=0𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=1 +  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 ,     (4) 
where the variables are defined as before and where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 are decomposed as 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+ + 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡− where 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+ and 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡− are partial sum processes of positive and negative changes 
in 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 and the 𝛾𝛾’s and 𝛽𝛽′𝑠𝑠 are the corresponding coefficients. 
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After running the NARDL model for both ENP_Candidate and ENP_Party and applying the 
Hausman tests, it was found that only in the case of ENP_Party does the model generate 
coefficient estimates consistent with separate short run state averages, allowing in the party 
case for the short run coefficients and error correction terms to indicate the asymmetry arising 
in the short run arising about the common long run cointegration time path.25 The NARDL 
results for ENP_Party are shown in Table 3.  However before proceeding to discuss the new 
findings, it is important to note that the rejection of asymmetry in the case of ENP_Candidate 
supports the relevance of the symmetric results found earlier.  This increases our confidence 
that the cointegrating equation estimated for ENP_Candidate (the results in Table 1 in Section 
5) is a meaningful representation of an equilibrium long run time path.  The rejection of 
asymmetry for ENP_Candidate and the provisional acceptance of asymmetry for ENP_Party is 
consistent with implied by our earlier discussion and inspection of Figures 2, 3, and 4.  There 
the smaller smooth response of the long run to both temporary and permanent changes in 
ENP_Candidate stood in dramatic contrast to the more dramatic stochastic changes in the long 
run equilibrium path implied by imposing symmetry on ENP_Party.    
-- insert Table 3 about here -- 
A quick scan of the long run coefficient estimates in Table 3 indicates that virtually all of the 
models’ covariates exhibit coefficient signs consistent with that predicted by the underlying 
theory and with many of those coefficients significantly different from zero at the ten percent 
significance level or beyond.26  While the results are similar to those indicated in the symmetric 
case of Table 2, the asymmetric results do produce three significant differences.  First, the 
effects of constituency size and incumbency that were perverse in sign in the symmetric case 
now have their predicted sign.  As expected, larger constituency sizes are now found to be 
positively associated with ENP_Party while larger numbers of incumbent candidates are 
associated with reductions in ENP.  The contractionary effect of more incumbents is found to be 
                                                          
25 For the ENP_Candidate PMG and MG estimates, the Hausman test for no systematic difference in the set of 
short run coefficients generates a chi2(9) = 12.8 with a Prob > Chi2 = 0.002. This allows us to reject the hypothesis 
that the two sets are not systematically different. 
26 The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels with cross section dependence 
rejects the hypothesis of unit roots in the state residuals. 
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significant in the long run while constituency size has a significant effect only in the short run.   
Second, the effects of the proportion of voters who are registered and the size of voter turnout 
which were significant in the symmetric case are now both found to be insignificant in the long 
run while the short run gives evidence of cyclical adjustment to short run variations in 
REGISTERED.27 Thirdly, the effect of the introduction of public funding that was found to be 
insignificantly positive in the symmetric case is now negative (but significantly different from 
zero at the 17 percent significance level).  That is, the data is weakly consistent with the 
hypothesis that the introduction of public funding for established political parties reduces the 
importance of both individual candidates and minor political parties relative to established 
parties.  Finally, the asymmetric results concur with those suggested earlier in that the 
pecuniary rewards received by elected party candidates have no significant effect on party 
participation as measured by ENP. 
When we turn to the short run, two things are immediately noticeable. First, the multiplicity of 
sign reversals in the lagged changes and the intermittent significant findings imply a short run 
that is both complex and specific to the incidence of shocks.  Second, and from our perspective 
more interesting, is the finding that short run adjustment is quite different depending upon 
whether the shocks and/or variable changes experienced are positive versus negative.  This is 
indicated by the error correction terms for positive and negative shocks being significantly 
different in size (-0.077 and- 0.127 with the probability that the two coefficient estimates are 
equal at less than one percent).  The smaller absolute size of the error correction term on 
positive departures indicates that the correction of positive departures from the equilibrium 
time path will be significantly slower than the correction of negative departures.  And while 
neither convergence process is particularly fast, convergence will be more than fifty percent 
faster for negative departures than for positive ones.  Similarly, positive changes to ENP_Party 
(for whatever reason) will be followed by both larger and more persistence changes to 
ENP_Party than will negative shocks. The lagged first difference coefficients (0.725 and 0.420) 
                                                          
27 Both TURNOUT and PENSION_PARAMETERS were found to be insignificant in all forms of the NARDL tests and 
were so omitted from the final equations. 
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span the coefficient estimate of the symmetric case (0.469) and imply a convergence path that 
takes longer to adjust to longer run equilibrium from positive changes than negative ones.   
The asymmetric pattern of adjustment implied by these estimates is then consistent with our 
earlier theoretical discussion.  The first-past-the-post electoral format induces overly optimistic 
entry in response to positive changes in the likelihood of electoral success while sunk party 
setup costs work to retain an excessively large number of parties by delaying exit. The result is 
an asymmetry under which the observed time path will differ from its longer run equilibrium 
more often on the up side which implies that the long run equilibrium will likely lie below the 
actual level of ENP_Party observed in the data.  Just such a result can be seen in Figure 5 where 
the asymmetric long run equilibrium time path estimated for ENP_Party (derived from the long 
run coefficient estimates of Table 3) is plotted as the dashed line relative to relative to the solid 
line that plots ENP_Party.28  Following the early period of convergence when party structure 
was in the process of adapting to a new national based federal environment (through 1900),  
long run ENP_Party adjusted for asymmetry has generally been below the level ENP_Party 
actual.  While the gap between these two measures has varied across time, the long run has 
remained below actual for almost the entire 1900 – 2011 time period.  The fringe, representing 
as it does the variation in support for the set of mid to small sized parties, is shown in Figure 6 
for the post 1900 time period. Its removal from ENP_Party moves the long run value much 
closer to the 2 expected by Duverger while also removing some of the overall upward trend 
observed in its actual level.    
--Figures 5 and 6 about here— 
7.  Does long run ENP or its fringe signal anything about political competition? 
The separation of observed ENP into a long run equilibrium time path and a fringe of entry/exit 
activity allows us to ask whether the fringe and/or the long run can tell us anything meaningful 
about the electoral competitiveness of the candidates and/or parties in the Canadian political 
                                                          
28 Long run NARDL ENP_Party excludes WW1 and WW2 but incorporates CONVERGENCE_TREND and 
FUNDING1974.  
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system?  In particular does the greater fragmentation indicated by rising long run ENP signal 
greater competitiveness among more parties and candidates offering a larger range of policies, 
programs and personalities or does greater fragmentation signal a reduction in the likelihood 
that any challenging candidate/party can win an election and thus provide less effective 
competition for incumbents.  Alternatively, is it the variation in the fringe of short run 
adjustment activity that provides more insight into the competitiveness of the political system?  
Finally, do the two ENP measures offer similar signals with respect to changes in political 
competition? 
One way of approaching these questions is to look at how the long run estimates of ENP’s size 
and their fringe correlate with other less controversial measures of political competitiveness.  
Here we choose three measures of political competitiveness used in the literature that can be 
regressed against the two dimensions of ENP variation: i) the Przeworski/Sprague measures of 
constituency competitiveness, competitiveness among candidates, PS_current_Candidate, and 
competitiveness amongst parties, PS_current_Party; ii) the proportion of contested seats in 
national elections that are electorally marginal, adjusted for any asymmetry in the distribution 
of marginal constituencies among the major political parties, Adj_marg_constituencies; and iii) 
the proportion of seats won by the governing political party, SEATS.29  Increases in the former 
two measures are treated as meters of electoral competitiveness while decreases in the latter 
are viewed as indicating greater competition for the governing party in the House.  In testing 
for the presence of a relationship by regressing these variables we note that the long run 
measures of ENP are both nonstationary or I(1), whereas the three competition variables are all 
stationary or I(0).30 Hence to assess the relationship between the long run ENP values and 
political competition (as measured by our three political competition alternatives) we use the 
first differences and so test whether changes in long run ENP are positively or negatively 
                                                          
29 See Ferris and Winer (2017) for greater detail on these measures.  Election outcomes are viewed as offering 
point estimates of an evolving political environment so that the annual observations on the competition measures 
represent interpolations between election years. 
30 The adjusted Dickey Fuller statistics for ENP_Party_LR and ENP_Candidate_LR are, respectively,  -1.43 and -1.19 
(for level with a constant) and -8.56, -10.84 (for first differences). The MacKinnon 10% critical value is -2.58.  The 
corresponding ADF’s for PS_current_Candidate,  PS_current_Party , Adj_marg_constituencies and Seats are, 
respectively, -4.38, -4.81, -3.73 and -4.39 (level, constant).   
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related to our metrics of political competition. Because both ENP_Fringe measures are 
stationary we can test directly for their association with the political competition measures.   
The results of these tests are presented in Table 4. 
--insert Table 4 about here— 
An examination of the equations in Table 4 indicates that of the two different sets of ENP 
measures it is the long run NARDL_ENP_Party equation that best provides evidence of a 
relationship arising between ENP and political competition.  None of the competition variables 
in the short run/fringe equations are significant at the five percent significance level and the 
explanatory power of the estimated equations comes almost entirely from the strong element 
of persistence that follows departures from the underlying long run.  To the extent that the 
results can be taken as somewhat suggestive of a role for the fringe, the sign pattern found in 
these regressions is consistent across the two equations and suggests that increases in the 
fringe are potential signals of greater political competition.  That is, a larger size fringe is 
associated with greater competition among the candidates and parties within constituencies, 
more seats that are marginal and symmetrically distributed and a smaller sized seat majority 
held by the governing party.31 More reasonably, the results suggest non-responsiveness of the 
fringe to political competition which would works to diminish the meaning of observed changes 
in ENP by embodying into the long run the random shocks and convergence characteristics of 
the adjustment process.   
Turning to look at the long run equilibrium time paths, we first note that fully five of the six 
competition coefficient estimates and the two significant ones all are consistent in sign with the 
hypothesis that an increase in long run ENP signals a reduction rather than an increase in 
political competition.32  In this sense the greater fragmentation signalled by a rising long run is 
more consistent with a reduction in competition coming from the reduced credibility of party 
                                                          
31 The exception in signage is for marginal seats adjusted for asymmetry. 
32 The exception is again the insignificant positive sign on marginal seats adjusted for asymmetry in long run 
ENP_Party 
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alternatives to the governing party than the hypothesis that greater fragmentation implies 
greater policy choice and hence a more competitive environment for voters.   
In terms of the two long run ENP equations, however, while the sets of signs are generally 
consistent across equation estimates, only the NARDL estimate of long run ENP_Party presents 
significant evidence of an association with our measures of political competition. For ENP_Party 
the data indicate that increases in the constituency competitiveness of political parties are 
significantly associated with decreases in long run ENP_Party (at the 1 percent significance 
level) while increases in the size of the seat majority held by the governing party and decreased 
in the competitiveness of the House of Commons are significantly associated with long run 
ENP_Party (at the 10 percent significance level).   
Overall, then, the data is consistent with the hypothesis that long run ENP_Party is inversely 
associated with political competition as measured by changes in PS_current_Party and SEATS 
and is not inconsistent with the same relationship holding for ENP_Candidate.  The data sheds 
little light on the relationship of the fringe with political competition at best suggesting that 
increases in the fringe may be positively related to political competition and hence inversely 
related to that implied by variations in long run ENP.   
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the structure of political party equilibrium in Canada with a 
view to answering the questions whether there has been a true upward trend in ENP away from 
Duverger’s 2 in Canada and if so whether an increase would signal more or less electoral 
competition.  We begin by arguing that the actual measures of candidate and party ENP are 
likely biased measures of equilibrium structure and use symmetric ARDL and asymmetric 
NARDL modeling to separate empirically the long run equilibrium to which candidate and party 
selection processes would evolve from the shorter run and convergence processes that we 
argue are likely to be asymmetric.  Doing so reveals a cointegrated long run equilibrium path for 
both ENP measures but a short run that is asymmetric only in the case of ENP_Party.  This we 
argue represents an ever-changing set of optimistic minor parties that are less successful 
competing in first-past-the-post tournament elections.  Having overcome relatively large setup 
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costs that are sunk following initial entry, these parties persist under election returns which if 
known would have prevented their entry.  This produces an observed outcome in which actual 
participants consistently outnumber the number of parties that can feasibly survive in long run 
equilibrium.    
Our findings with respect to the long run size of the two ENP measures confirm a number of 
hypotheses advanced in the literature for party structure generally and particularly for Canada.  
For example, increases in district size, the voting franchise, voter turnout, and religious diversity 
are all associated with higher ENP candidate and party levels.  Similarly increases in the 
proportion of candidate and party incumbents running for re-election are both associated with 
lower ENP values.  On the other hand, there is relatively little evidence in the data that MP 
salaries and/or pension benefits are successful incentives attracting electoral candidates or 
additional parties.  The public funding of political parties initiated in 1974, however, appears to 
have had the effect of reducing the expected participation of independent candidates running 
and the finding that party based ENP has fallen suggests that public funding has helped 
consolidating the position of the major parties relative to minor parties.  Finally the particular 
political measures introduced during WW1 in Canada to reduce competition through special 
legislation and a coalition government party is reflected in the data as a fall in both ENP 
measures while the effect of agreeing to lessen party competition during WW2 without 
legislative reinforcement led to the rapid entry of new parties immediately following and an 
upward jump in ENP. 
We conclude by examining the correlations between our separated ENP measures—long run 
size and fringe—with three traditional measures of competitiveness in the election process and 
legislature.  In neither long run case do we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
larger ENP values signal greater political competition.  Rather in the case of ENP_Party in 
particular, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that increases in ENP signal decreases 
in the competitiveness of the political system. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
a.  Description and sources 
AGRIC = percentage of the labour force in agriculture 1870-1925 M.C. Urquhart (1993) Gross National 
Product, Derivation of Estimates, p.24; 1926-1975 Cansim D31251/D31252; 1975-2011 Cansim II 
v2710106/v2710104;  AVERAGE_AGRICULTURE = average size over the previous governing period.  
GNP = gross national product in current dollars. 1870-1926: Urquhart (1993: 24-25) (in millions); 1927-
1938: Leacy et al. (1983: 130); 19391960 Canadian Economic Observer (Table 1.4), CANSIM D11073 = 
GNP at market prices. 1961-2011 CANSIM I D16466 = CANSIM II V499724 (aggregated from quarterly).  
GOV = total federal government expenditure net of interest payments.1870-1989: Gillespie (1991: 284-
286); 1990-1996: Public Accounts of Canada 1996-97: 1997-2000: Federal Government Public Accounts, 
Table 3 Budgetary Revenues Department of Finance web site, September 2001. To this we add the 
return on government investment (ROI) originally subtracted by Gillespie for his own purposes. 
Expenditure is net of interest paid to the private sector. Data on ROI: 1870 to 1915: Public Accounts 
(1917: 64); 1915-1967: Dominion Government Revenue and Expenditure: Details of Adjustments 1915-
1967 Table W-1; 1916-17 to 1966-67: Securing Economic Renewal - The Fiscal Plan, Feb 10, 1988, Table 
XI; 1987-88 to 1996-97: Public Accounts 1996, Table 2.2. Interest on the Debt (ID) was subtracted out 
(with adjustment for interest paid to the Bank of Canada (BCI) ultimately returned to the government). 
Data on ID: 1870-1926: Leacy et al. (1983: Series H19-34): Federal Government budgetary expenditures, 
classiﬁed by function, 1867-1975; 1926-1995: Cansim D11166. 1996-2000: Cansim D18445. Finally, data 
for BCI: copied by hand from the Annual Reports of The Bank of Canada, Statement of Income and 
Expense, Annually, 1935-2000. Net Income paid to the Receiver General (for the Consolidated Revenue 
Acct). Note: all government data are converted from ﬁscal to calendar years, and allows for a change in 
the deﬁnition of the ﬁscal year in 1906/07, as described in Gillespie (1991: Appendix C).  GSIZE = non-
interest federal government, direct public expenditure, calculated as: GOV/GNP; LNGSIZE = Log(GSIZE); 
AVEGROWTH_GOV = average of LNGSIZE – LNGSIZE(-1) over the previous governing interval.  
POP = the population size of Canada, 1870 – 1926: M.C. Urquhart (1993), Gross National Product of 
Canada 1870-1926, The Derivation of Estimates p. 24-25 (in thousands); 1927 – 1955: CANSIM data 
label D31248; 1996-2011  CANSIM Table 051-0005: Estimates of population, Canada, provinces and 
territories; Canada D1 Average of quarters. 
IMMIGRATION: 1870 1953 O.J. Firestone Canada’s Economic Development 1867-1953 Table 83, 
Population, Families, Births, Deaths (in thousands); 1954-1995; Cansim D27; 1996-2011 Cansim II v16.  
IMRATIO = Immigration/POP where POP = Canadian population size. AVE_IMMIGRATION_RATE = 
average value of Imratio over the previous governing interval. 
RELIGION = 1/{Herfindahl index of religious denominations}, interpolated between Censuses.  
RGNPPC = (GNP)/(P*POP); LNGNPPC = Log(RGNPPC); PCGrowth = LNRGNPPC – LNRGNPPC(-1).  
AVEGROWTH_PC = average of PCGROWTH over the previous governing interval. 
P = GDP deflator:  1870-1926: Urquhart, (1993), 24-25; 1929-1960 (1986=100), Cansim data label 
D14476; 1961-2011, Cansim II V1997756. All indexes converted to 1986 = 100 basis.  
INFLATION = LNP – LNP(-1); AVEINFLATION = average of INFLATION over the previous governing interval.  
REGISTERED = fraction of the population registered to vote.   Source: Elections Canada web site, 
www.elections.ca/past elections/A History of the Vote in Canada: Appendix 
 TURNOUT = fraction of registered voters who voted.  Source: Elections Canada web site, 
www.elections.ca/past elections/A History of the Vote in Canada: Appendix 
MINORITY = 1 when election resulted in a minority government. 
WW1 = 1 for 1914 – 1917, 0 otherwise; WW2 = 1 for 1940-1945, otherwise 0. 
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Number of political parties collected by election from Elections Canada to determine time of entry, exit 
and duration. Online at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/FederalRidingsHistory/HFER.aspsee  
ENP_Local = (1/Herfindahl index of vote shares by candidate across constituencies) = 1/national mean 
of ∑(1/∑𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2 ),  where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is the vote share of candidate i in constituency j.  ENP_106 uses 105 different 
parties plus other whereas ENP_Candidate uses candidates independent of party affiliation (where 13 is 
the maximum number of candidates running in any constituency). Candidates acclaimed were given a 
vote share of 1 while parties that were acclaimed were given the average consistency vote as part of a 
recalculation of national party vote shares. 
ENP_CONVERGENCE = linear trend of ENP_106 from 1870 through 1898 (party formation period). 
INCUMBENTS = proportion of incumbents running for election, interpolated across elections 
AVE_ELECTORS = average number of electors across constituencies, interpolated across elections 
RELATIVE_MP_WAGE = REAL_Adj_MP_Salary/RGDPPC (MP salaries are adjusted for allowances). 
PENSION_PARAMETERS = MP accrual rate/MP contribution rate (beginning in 1952). 
PUBLIC FUNDING 1974 = 0 from 1870 – 1993; 1 from 1974 onward. 
 
Political Competition Variables: 
AMCons = Asymmetric adjusted marginal constituencies = 1 - 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡, where 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 is the proportion of safe 
constituencies in the previous election and 𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 is a Euclidean distance measure of asymmetry across the 
shares of safe seats.  Safeness is defined using a three-year moving measure of volatility and a 1 
standard deviation test. Lower values of 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜙𝜙𝑡𝑡 indicate either that more constituencies have become 
marginal or that the distribution of marginal constituencies across parties has become more 
symmetrical.  In either case the election outcome has become less predictable ex ante.  See also the 
Data Appendix in Ferris, Winer and Grofman (2016).  
Adj_marg_constituencies AMCons adjusted for constituency redistributions.  Because redistricting and 
the addition of new constituencies were frequent in Canada’s electoral history, large numbers of 
constituencies will have no past history and hence no clear basis for assigning safeness.  However, since 
some new constituencies will be formed out of constituencies that were previously safe, we defined the 
safeness of new constituencies (at the aggregate level) as the proportion of all current constituencies 
that would otherwise have been treated as safe. That is rather than simply treating all redistributed 
seats as marginal or as equivalent in safeness to the proportion of safe seats in the ongoing 
constituencies that did have incumbents, the set of redistributed constituencies were treated as being 
between these two extremes.  
PS_current_Party = the Przeworski and Sprague measure of competitiveness at the constituency level 
and is the sum of a weighted measure of the volatility adjusted vote margin that each party must 
overcome at the constituency level relative to the incumbent winning party.  To avoid the loss of data 
arising from acclamations and redistricting, the following conventions were adopted.  Party candidates 
winning by acclamation were given a vote-share of 1 and were awarded the national constituency average 
number of votes to weigh their significance relative to other constituencies.  This resulted in a larger 
adjusted national vote as the new base for the calculation of adjusted constituency vote shares.  
Redistributions were handled by creating pseudo-predecessor constituencies using the average vote 
shares of those parties of the constituencies (within the same super-constituency) that had been lost due 
to the redistricting. If the constituency was entirely new (no old constituencies were lost), the previous 
super-constituency average was used and if the super-constituency itself was new (as in the case of 
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Newfoundland), the national average was used.  The PS index runs between and 1 with higher values 
indicating a more competitive constituency.  The PS version used in the text uses current party outcomes.  
Volatility. Because the size of a winning vote margin is meaningful only in relation to the volatility of the 
constituency’s vote margin, we needed a measure of vote volatility over time. Then to avoid the loss of 
information when new constituencies were added or reformed (and hence have no past), we constructed 
a number of regional super-constituencies - 80 in total - based on geographic regions that persist 
throughout Canada’s election history for measures that required past election outcomes. These 
established regional specific vote volatilities for use in periods when a new constituency was created or 
an old one reshaped. To give one example, the area around Ottawa was used as the base for one of 29 
Ontario super-constituencies. Electorally it consisted of one 1 riding in 1867 and had risen to include 7 
ridings by 2011. A super-constituency volatility for each area and election was then computed as follows. 
First the average vote shares by party over the constituencies within a superconstituency were computed. 
Next the absolute value of the changes in these (party-specific) average vote shares across adjacent 
elections was computed, summed and divided by 2. Each of these super-constituency specific differences 
in vote shares were weighted by the relative number of constituencies inside each superconstituency and 
summed to derive an aggregate volatility number for each election. This volatility measure was then 
applied to vote margins whether a constituency was new or not.  
SEATS = the proportion of seats won by the governing party. 
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Table 1 
ARDL (3,0,0,1,1,1,1,0, 0,0,0) Model of ENP_CANDIDATES: Canada: 1870 – 2011 
(absolute value of t statistics in brackets) 
Level 
 
 
Predicted Sign             (+/-) 
ARDL Model 
Schwartz criterion used 
for Lag selection  
ENP_Candidate Measure 
Long Run Model 
 
 
ENP_Candidate 
Short Run 
 
 
D(ENP_Candidate)  
Model 
ENP_Candidate(-1) 
 
1.085*** 
(13.60) 
 D(ENP_Candidate(-1)) 0.413*** 
(6.31) 
ENP_Candidate(-2) 
 
-0.212* 
(1.81) 
 D(ENP_Candidate(-2)) 0.189*** 
(2.79) 
ENP_Candidate(-3) -0.190 
(2.56)** 
   
RELATIVE_MP_WAGE    (+) 
 
0.0029 
(0.955) 
0.009 
(0.961) 
D(RELATIVE_MP 
WAGE) 
-0.001 
(0.200) 
PENSION_PARAMETERS(+) 0.0165 
(0.638) 
0.052 
(0.632) 
D(PENSION_ 
                   PARAMETERS) 
-0.017 
(0.371) 
REGISTERED                    (+) 
 
-0.004** 
(2.50) 
0.005* 
(1.95) 
D(REGISTERED) -0.004*** 
(3.18) 
REGISTERED(-1) 
 
0.006*** 
(4.04) 
   
TURNOUT                         (+) 
 
0.00008 
(0.051) 
0.008** 
(2.25) 
D(TURNOUT) 0.00006 
(0.040) 
TURNOUT(-1) 
 
0.003 
(1.60) 
   
RELIGION                          (+) 
 
0.055 
(0.992) 
0.173 
(0.972) 
D(RELIGION) 0.060 
(0.249) 
CONSTITUENCY SIZE       (+) 0.00002** 
(2.40) 
0.00002*** 
(2.80) 
D(CONSTITUENCY_SIZE) 0.00002*** 
(3.89) 
CONSTITUENCY SIZE(-1) -0.00001 
(1.54) 
   
AVG_INCUMBENTS         (-) -0.276*** 
(4.95) 
-0.267** 
(2.33) 
D(AVG_INCUMBENTS) -0.286*** 
(5.43) 
AVG_INCUMBENTS(-1) 0.192*** 
(3.56) 
   
IMRATIO                           (?) -0.010** 
(2.10) 
-0.032** 
(2.02) 
D(IMRATIO) -0.013* 
(1.79) 
URBAN_PROPORTION    (?) 
 
-0.960** 
(2.49) 
-3.03*** 
(2.71) 
D(URBAN_PROPORTION) -1.31 
(1.54) 
FUNDING1974                 (-) 
 
-0.071** 
(2.37) 
-0.226*** 
(2.71) 
D(FUNDING1974) -0.045 
(1.11) 
WW1                                 (-) 
 
-0.072*** 
(2.75) 
-0.229*** 
(2.63) 
D(WW1) -0.094*** 
(3.08) 
WW2                                 (+) 
 
0.051*** 
(2.73) 
0.160*** 
(2.63) 
D(WW2) 0.042 
(1.49) 
CONSTANT 
 
0.546** 
(2.35) 
1.726*** 
(2.64) 
Error correction 
Term 
-0.319*** 
(8.19) 
Adj R2 
Bounds Test: 1%  
I(1) 1% upper bound 3.68 
.984 
 
6.90*** 
 No. of Observations 
Log Likelihood 
139 
261.4 
***,(**),[*] significantly different from zero at 1%, (5%),[10%];   
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Table 2 
ARDL (4,0,1,2,1,1,1,2,1) Model of ENP_Party (with Acclamations) 
Canada: 1870 – 2011 
(absolute value of t-statistics in brackets) 
 ARDL Model 
Schwartz criterion used 
for Lag selection 
ENP_Party Measure 
Long Run 
Model 
 
ENP_Party 
Short Run 
 
 
D(ENP_Party)  
Model 
ENP_Party(-1) 
 
1.214*** 
(10.03) 
 D(ENP_Party(-1)) 0.469*** 
(7.31) 
ENP_Party(-2) 
 
-0.263* 
(1.85) 
 D(ENP_Party(-2)) 0.205*** 
(2.82) 
ENP_Party(-3) 
 
-0.060 
(0.981) 
 D(ENP_Party(-3) 0.145** 
(2.07) 
ENP_Party(-4) 
 
-0.146** 
(2.58) 
   
RELATIVE_MP_WAGE    (+)                          -0.011 
(1.48) 
-0.041 
(1.54) 
  
REGISTERED                     (+) 
 
-0.009*** 
(3.06) 
0.018*** 
(2.91) 
D(REGISTERED) -0.009*** 
(2.69) 
REGISTERED(-1) 0.013*** 
(4.46) 
   
TURNOUT                         (+) 
 
0.003 
(0.712) 
0.039*** 
(2.98) 
D(TURNOUT) -0.003 
(0.950) 
TURNOUT(-1) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.050) 
 D(TURNOUT(-1)) -0.007** 
(2.09) 
TURNOUT(-2) 
 
0.007* 
(1.68) 
   
RELIGION 
 
-2.387 
(1.64) 
2,259*** 
(5.80) 
D(RELIGION) -2.387** 
(2.27) 
RELIGION(-1) 
 
2.962* 
(1.96) 
   
CONSTITUENCY SIZE       (+) -0.00003 
(1.131) 
-0.00005** 
(2.19) 
D(CONSTITUENCY SIZE) 0.00005** 
(2.40) 
CONSTITUENCY SIZE(-1) 
 
-0.00004* 
(1.72) 
   
AVG_INCUMBENTS         (-) 
 
-0.474** 
(1.96) 
0.077 
(0.279) 
D(INCUMBENTS) -0.474*** 
(3.77) 
AVG_INCUMBENTS(-1) 
 
0.493** 
(2.23) 
   
IMRATIO                           (?) 
 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.060 
(1.33) 
D(IMRATIO) -0.0003 
(0.018) 
IMRATIO(-1) 
 
-0.053 
(1.04) 
 D(IMRATIO(-1)) -0.038** 
(2.26) 
IMRATIO(-2) 
 
0.038 
(1.30) 
   
URBAN_PROPORTION   (?) 
 
-2.473 
(0.849) 
7.667* 
(1.91) 
D(URBAN_PROPORTION) -2.473 
(1.192) 
URBAN_PROPORTION(-1) 
 
4.423 
(1.55) 
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WW1                                 (-) 
 
-0.163*** 
(2.81) 
-1.63** 
(2.23) 
  
WW2                                 (+) 
 
0.119*** 
(2.98) 
0.119*** 
(2.76) 
  
CONVERGENCE TREND (+) 0.028*** 
(4.87) 
0.028*** 
(537) 
  
FUNDING1974                  
 
0.024 
(0.515) 
0.024 
(0.398) 
  
CONSTANT 
 
-1.786*** 
(3.868) 
-18.55*** 
(3.80) 
Error Correction Term -0.254*** 
(8.73) 
Adj R2 
Bounds Test:  F-statistic  
(I1  1% upper bound 3.77) 
.982 
 
7.04*** 
 No. of Observations 
Log Likelihood 
138 
144.4 
***,(**),[*] significantly different from zero at 1%, (5%),[10%]. 
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Table 3  
NARDL (2,3,3,0,3,3,3,3) Model of ENP_Party 
 Canada 1870-2011 
(absolute value of standard errors in brackets below coefficient estimates) 
Levels 
     Predicted sign (+/-) 
Long Run Differences (D) Short Run 
Positive 
Short Run 
Negative 
  D(ENP_PARTY(-1)) 
 
0.725*** 
(13.03) 
0.420*** 
(6.60) 
RELATIVE_MP_WAGE   (+) 0.007 
(0.23) 
D(RELATIVE_MP_WAGE) 0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.001 
(0.05) 
  D(RELATIVE_MP_WAGE(-1)) 0.016** 
(2.19) 
-0.013 
(0.59) 
  D(RELATIVE_MP_WAGE(-2)) 
 
-0.003 
(0.38) 
0.030 
(1.35) 
REGISTERED                  (+) 
 
0.007 
(1.06) 
D(REGISTERED) -0.007*** 
(3.59) 
-0.008 
(1.28) 
  D(REGISTERED(-1) 
 
0.002 
(0.67) 
0.017*** 
(2.75) 
  D(REGISTERED(-2)) 
 
0.001 
(0.36) 
-0.013** 
(2.10) 
RELIGION                     (+) 
 
0.871*** 
(2.87) 
D(RELIGION) 0.002 
(0.001) 
5.13 
(0.40) 
  D(RELIGION(-1)) -2.58 
(1.37) 
-54.08*** 
(3.28) 
  D(RELIGION(-2)) 1.78 
(1.32) 
-4.666 
(0.39) 
IMRATIO                        (?) 
 
-0.050 
(0.99) 
   
CONSTITUENCY SIZE   (+) 0.00005 
(0.20) 
D(CONSTITUENCY SIZE) 
 
0.0002** 
(2.07) 
-0.0001 
(1.43) 
  D(CONSTITUENCY SIZE(-1)) 
 
-0.00004 
(0.59) 
0.00001 
(0.04) 
  D(CONSTITUENCY SIZE(-2) 
 
-0.00001 
(0.77) 
0.00002 
(0.06) 
AVG_INCUMBENTS    (-) 
 
-0.703** 
(2.02) 
D(AVG_INCUMBENTS) -0.0001 
(1.42) 
-0.146 
(0.61) 
  D(AVG_INCUMBENTS(-1)) 
 
0.0001 
(0.97) 
0.224 
(0.77) 
  D(AVG_INCUMBENTS(-2)) 
 
-0.00003 
(0.714) 
0.012 
(0.05) 
URBAN_PROPORTION  (?) 1.802 
(0.43) 
D(URBAN_PROPORTION) 0.178 
(0.14) 
17.35 
(0.95) 
  D(URBAN_PROPORTION(-1)) 
 
0.166 
(0.10) 
4.542 
(0.27) 
  D(URBAN_PROPORTION(-2)) 
 
-1.92 
(1.33) 
-1.986 
(0.15) 
WW1                              (-) 
 
-0.434* 
(1.65) 
CONSTANT 0.007 
(0.08) 
0.013 
(0.08) 
WW2                             (+) 
 
0.659*** 
(3.54) 
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CONVERGENCE TREND 0.112*** 
(10.43) 
ERROR CORRECTION  
TERM 
-0.077*** 
(6.16) 
-0.127*** 
(6.42) 
FUNDING1974              (-)  
 
-0.309 
(1.37) 
Number of Observations 
Log Likelihood 
278 
423.3 
 
*, (**), [***] significantly different from zero at 10%, (5%), [1%] 
-- Test of error correction term (state1) = error correction term (state 2) = 0; chi2(2) = 71.7; Prob > chi2 = 0.00.  
-- Hausman test of the hypothesis that the short run coefficients estimated under the assumption that the long run 
coefficients are constant across states are not systematically different from their average generates a chi2(10) = 
0.00.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
ENP_Measures as Indicators of Political Competitiveness: 1900 – 2011 
(absolute value of Newey-West t-statics in brackets below coefficient estimates) 
Competition  
Variable 
D(ENP_Candidate 
Long Run) 
ARDL 
ENP_Candidate 
ARDL 
Fringe 
D(ENP_Party 
 Long Run) 
NARDL 
ENP_Party 
NARDL 
Fringe 
Przeworski and Sprague 
Constituency based, 
Candidate measure 
-0.010 
(0.165) 
0.047 
(0.724) 
  
Przeworski and Sprague 
Constituency based, 
Party measure 
  -0.358*** 
(4.83) 
0.142 
(1.08) 
Asymmetry adjusted 
marginal seats 
-0.012 
(0.263) 
0.017 
(0.050) 
0.057 
(1.14) 
-0.018 
(0.176) 
SEATS 
 
0.088 
(1.42) 
-0.106 
(1.53) 
0.121* 
(1.65) 
-0.0001 
(0.094) 
Constant 
 
-0.028 
(0.574) 
-0.026 
(0.472) 
0.136** 
(2.51) 
0.002 
(0.019) 
Lagged  
Dependent variable 
 0.946*** 
(10.16) 
 1.272*** 
(14.13) 
Twice lagged  
Dependent variable 
 -0.342*** 
(3.75) 
 -0.423*** 
(4.69) 
Statistics: 
Observations 
AdjR2 
DW (3, 112: 1.603) 
 
112 
0.00 
2.08 
 
112 
0.574 
2.06 
 
112 
0.161 
1.62 
 
112 
0.842 
2.04 
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